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INTRODUCTION

To date, cyberattacks have cost American companies trillions of
dollars.' The average data breach costs companies nearly $500,000.2
Cyberattacks are not only disruptive and time-consuming; they can also
result in disclosure of corporate strategic planning information, which
would otherwise be shielded from the public.3 Additionally, the nature of
hacking has evolved tremendously, even in just the last decade. 4 When
hacking first came to the public's attention, hackers and cybercriminals
would flaunt their ability to bypass complex codes and encryption
designed to safeguard sensitive information. 5 Computer hackers prided
themselves on outsmarting any security measure, and identifying
themselves as the source of the attack.6 Cybercriminals grow much more
1. See Matt Egan, Report: Cyber Crime Costs Global Economy Up to $500B a Year, Fox
Bus. (July 22, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2013/07/22/report-cyber-crimecosts-global-economy-up-to-l-trillion-year (comparing cybercrime to other criminal activities:
"global cyber activity costs between $100 billion and $500 billion each year, compared with $600
billion in cost associated with drug trafficking and $1 billion to $16 billion in costs tied to piracy").
2. Cyberattacks on the Rise: Are Private Companies Doing Enough to Protect
Themselves?, PwC (2014), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-company-services/
publications/assets/pwc-gyb-cyber security.pdf [hereinafter Cyberattacks on the Rise].
3. Id.
4. Cybercrime: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI), availableat http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CHRG- I06shrg63940/html/CHRG- I 06shrg63940.htm.
5. Id.
6. S. Krishnan, Welcome to the Era of Hacking, Total Exposure, TRAVELING TIME (Aug.
31, 2012), http://krishnanl983.blogspot.com/2012/08/hacking-in-todays-world.html.
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7
sophisticated as technological developments continue to advance.
more often financially motivated and committed
Attacks are now
8
anonymously.
The inability to identify where the source of an attack originates can
spark political turmoil 9-- countries are quick to blame one another. 10 It is
difficult to combat an enemy without an identity or physical location. I"
Modem cyberattackers are predatory and patient. 12 Hackers install
complicated malware that allows them to monitor corporations for
months, waiting for the perfect time to strike. 13 Finally, the most
troublesome aspect of data breaches and cybersecurity measures is that
what may be adequate one day may become obsolete the next day. 14 In
response to these daunting developments, cybersecurity defense systems
have also evolved.15 In fact, these new systems identify hackers and target
threats that may have only recently gone unnoticed, until it was too late. 16
Although not discussed in depth, some examples are mentioned later in
the Note.
This Note seeks to explore the impact of cybersecurity in a particular
context: corporate law. Specifically, this Note examines whether a Board
of Directors (Board) should be liable for breach of fiduciary duty for
failure to take reasonable and prophylactic measures to protect sensitive
corporate data. As the magnitude and sophistication of cyberthreats

7.

THOMAS

CALABRESE,

PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION

INFORMATION

SECURITY

INTELLIGENCE:

CRYPTOGRAPHIC

69 (2004).

8. Daniel Sieberg, Hackers Shift Focusto FinancialGain-InternetCriminalNot Content
to Just Wreak Havoc Online, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2005rECH/intemet/09/26/identity.
hacker/(last updated Sept. 26,2005 21:54 GMT); see also David E. Sanger, PentagonAnnounces
New Strategyfor Cyberwarfare, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
24/us/politics/pentagon-announces-new-cyberwarfare-strategy.html?smprod-nytcore-ipad&sm
id=nytcore-ipad-share&_r-0.
9. Sanger, supra note 8.
10. Jennifer Steinhauer, House Passes Cybersecurity Bill After Companies Fall Victim to
Data Breaches, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/us/politics/
computer-attacks-spur-congress-to-act-on-cybersecurity-bill-years-in-making.html?smprod-ny
tcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share ("Mr. Obama Blamed North Korea for the [Sony] attack.").
11. Id.
12. See generally Jessica Lavery, Which Is More Dangerous: Cause-Motivated or
Financially Motivated Hackers?, VERACODE (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.veracode.com/blog/
2015/02/which-more-dangerous-cause-motivated-or-financially-motivated-hackers.
13. Sieberg, supra note 8; See also APTI: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage
Units, MANDIANT (2013), available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/MandiantAPT1 _Report.
pdf.
14. See Brad Lunn, Strengthened Director Duties of Carefor Cybersecurity Oversight:
Evolving Expectations of Existing Legal Doctrine, 4 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 109, 131 (2014).
15. Tod Newcombe, The Nation's Evolving Cyber-Security Issue: Are States Shoring up
Their Defenses Enough to ProtectCriticalDataand Computer Infrastructure?,GOVERNING (Dec.
2010), http://www.goveming.com/topics/technology/nations-evolving-cyber-security-issue.html.
16. See Cyberattacks on the Rise, supra note 2.
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17
advances, the resulting harm to corporations develops as well.
Corporations are not implementing enough cybersecurity measures to
protect their data and sensitive information, and existing law does not
create sufficient incentives for corporations and their Boards to take
necessary precautions to protect sensitive information from
cyberthreats.18 To complicate the matter, corporations are reluctant to
disclose cyberbreaches because of the impact on their reputation, their
profitability, and due to fear of increased liability. 19
Awareness and concern for data breaches must motivate companies to
take action. Corporations need stronger incentives to implement more
effective security measures and should be subject to greater resulting
penalties for non-compliance. 20 Companies often fail to invest in
cybersecurity because it is viewed as discretionary spending instead of a
business imperative. 2 1 It is critical that Boards begin to treat cybersecurity
as they would any other corporate concern. Indeed, a company may
actually be thwarting its economic growth by not preparing for an
inevitable cyberattack. In fact, a majority of consumers avoid doing
business with corporations that fail to protect its cyberinformation.22 The
adverse economic effects of data breaches have not yet motivated the
majority of corporations to prioritize prophylactic cybersecurity
measures within their corporate governance.
The author asserts that existing legal doctrines can be adapted to
address potential data breaches so as to require a Board to properly
manage cybersecurity concerns. Moreover, information technology
assessment should be incorporated into corporate governance. Modem
courts have been reluctant to hold directors liable for a breach of their
fiduciary responsibilities for oversight liability and have only recently
begun to address cybersecurity issues.
Corporations have escaped liability for negligent data protection for

17. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 227-30, 253-56 (2008); Steven
Overly, Cyber Attacks Present a Greater Risk to Firms as They Collect More Data about
Customers, WASH. POST (May 1], 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capital
business/cyber-attacks-present-a-greater-risk-to-firms-as-they-collect-more-data-about-customer
s/2014/05/1 l/ee861a90-d494-1 e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4el Istory.html.
18. Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1503, 1503
(2013); Gerry Smith, New Law Would Force Companies Like Target to Report Hacks
Quickly, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/02/24/companies-hacked n 4848160.html.
19. See Lunn, supra note 14 at 112.
20. See Michael Daniel, Incentives to Support Adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 6, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/08/06/

incentives-support-adoption-cybersecurity- framework.
21. Cyberattacks on the Rise, supra note 2.
22. 10 Minutes on Data Privacy, PwC (2014), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/
1Ominutes/assets/pwc-data-privacy.pdf.
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four reasons. First, chancery judges grant too much deference to the
decisions of a corporation's Special Litigation Committee (SLC), often
dismissing meritorious derivative claims alleging violations of the duty
of care. Second, courts are confused about a Board's fiduciary duties as
well as the extent of authority on oversight liability. Third, courts often
misapply the Business Judgment Rule (BJR), permitting directors to hide
behind lackluster security and risk assessment measures. Finally, courts
have not yet had the opportunity to apply the concepts of the duty of good
faith and the duty of loyalty to cybersecurity cases because courts have
only recently clarified how these duties apply to oversight. The author
challenges the chancery court's decision in Stone v. Ritter.23 By framing
oversight claims under the duty of loyalty, instead of under the duty of
care, the court severely limited the likelihood that cyberoversight claims
will succeed in the near future. 24 The author contends that the reason
fiduciary oversight liability has failed to expand to the realm of
cybersecurity stems from both intellectual dishonesty and from a general
lack of cybersecurity understanding.
This Note proposes a reasonable solution to the data breach problem
through a combination of enforcement of existing corporate legal
principles, and continued shareholder pressure to scrutinize cybersecurity
measures taken by a Board. The structure of this Note will first illustrate
the intersection between corporate and cyberlaw as it pertains to
cybersecurity and director fiduciary duties through the use of a
hypothetical corporate Board. The author will then highlight both the
negligence of the hypothetical board's response to a cyberattack, and the
likely response of courts applying existing legal doctrines as they are
currently and erroneously interpreted. The author will conclude with
potential solutions through modification of existing law to appropriately
address growing concerns, as well as review an appropriate Board
response to a cyberbreach and explore lessons that can be learned for the
future.
I.

CASE STUDY: HYPOTHETICAL CORPORATION XYZ-THE BOARD
SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE, BUT ESCAPES LIABILITY DUE TO

INADEQUACIES IN THE LAW

XYZ is a successful corporation that owns some of the largest
professional sports teams in the nation. The directors are aware of the
need for appropriate oversight and the importance of spotting red flags
23. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); see
also infra Part llI.D (explaining the evolution of the courts treatment of good faith).
24. See infra Part llI.D (explaining that by refraining good faith as a duty of loyalty claim
the courts limited the possibility of oversight claims).
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for compliance issues. Cybersecurity issues, however, are not discussed
at directors' meetings. Neither the risk committee nor the Board
addressed information technology.
The corporation's network contains sensitive information about the
athlete team members, including: credit card numbers, personal
addresses, family members' addresses, birth dates and social security
numbers. The CEO advised the directors that hackers have accessed the
network and stolen confidential data for over 200,000 athlete-members.
Further, the CEO noted that the network was also accessed between 5-7
times in the last few years, although nothing was technically stolen during
that time period. XYZ never disclosed the previous breaches to the
public, nor did the Board address it. When XYZ disclosed the recent
attack in a newspaper article, its stock price dropped from $75/share to
$40/share, and a number of its members decided to join a rival sports
team management corporation, ABC.
Sammy Shareholder, of XYZ, brings a derivative action against XYZ
alleging that the Board breached its duty of care and loyalty. Prior to
bringing a derivative action, Sammy is required to make a demand on
XYZ's SLC. The committee consists of outside directors who have
business relationships with the Board. None of the SLC members have a
risk management or assessment background. Further, all of the directors,
both on the SLC and those that serve on the Board, have a very
rudimentary understanding of the Internet, of the need to protect sensitive
information, and of the increasing magnitude of data breaches. The SLC
rejected Sammy's demand. The SLC determined that it would not be in
the best interest of XYZ to sue itself. The SLC concluded that the
directors had no reason to monitor intrusions into the network that did not
result in any economic damage or harm to an individual.
The claim alleges a breach of fiduciary duty based on the theory that
the decrease in share price adversely affected the value of every
shareholder's XYZ stock. Sammy asserts that the Board failed to
implement adequate security measures to protect the members' sensitive
data. Sammy alleges that the company shielded the information from the
shareholders and public in order to avoid an inevitable drop in stock price.
A court reviewed the allegations of Sammy's claim and determined
that it should be dismissed with prejudice, consistent with the
recommendation of the SLC. The judge determined that because no
tangible damage occurred to the shareholders during the period prior to
the attack, the directors did not act with gross negligence. Therefore, the
Board was protected from liability by the BJR. 25 Additionally, the court
found that the directors did not act in bad faith, or violate the duty of
loyalty because when a data breach actually occurred, the directors
25.

See infra Part Il.C (giving a more in-depth analysis on the business judgment rule).
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disclosed the incident, and took measures to handle the matter
immediately.
II. CASE STUDY: THE WYNDHAM CORPORATION-A BOARD'S GUIDE
TO AVOIDING CYBERSECURITY OVERSIGHT LIABILITY

Between 2008 and 2010, the Wyndham Hotels sustained three
cyberattacks resulting in the loss of 600,000 customers' sensitive credit
card data and personal information.2 6 Prior to filing an action in court, the
shareholder lodged a universal demand with the Board, insisting that the
company resolve the fallout from the attack and hold those internally
responsible for the damages to the corporation. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) was also investigating the hotel, which successfully
survived the effect of the investigation. 27 The SLC determined that the
Board responded adequately to the FTC investigation, and when the
shareholder made a demand, it recommended Wyndham dismiss the
claim. 28 The Board unanimously refused to investigate the shareholders'
demand on the SLC.
The plaintiff ultimately filed a derivative action alleging that
Wyndham's Board breached the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The
plaintiffs claim proceeded on two theories: (1) the company failed to
implement adequate data security measures to protect customer's
sensitive data, and (2) the company failed to disclose the breach and
shielded this information from investors. 29 The case was dismissed with
prejudice. 3°
The Palkon court reasoned that the BJR 3' appropriately shielded the
Board from incurring liability from allegedly breaching its duty of care
or duty of oversight.32 The Board discussed the breaches at 14 separate
meetings between 2008-2012 and the Audit Committee discussed the
33
breaches in 16 additional meetings during this time period.
Additionally, the Board hired a third party technology firm to assess their
information security procedures. 34 Further, the court determined that the
26. Palkon v. Holmes, No. 14-cv-1234, 2014 WL 5341880, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *7.
31. See infra Part III.C (giving a more in-depth analysis on the business judgment rule).
32. Palkon, 2014 WL 5341880, at *7.
33. Id. at *2.
34. See Goodwin Procter, Breaches in the Boardroom: What Directors and Officers can
do to Reduce the Risk of PersonalLiabilityfor Data Security Breaches, Bus. LITIG. REP. (Feb. 6,
2015), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsetters/Business-Litigatin-Reporter/
2015/February-2015-Business-Litigation-Comer.aspx?article=l.
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directors did not act in bad faith since security measures existed when the
first breach occurred and35the Board had addressed data security concerns
on numerous occasions.
III. A HISTORY

OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IMPOSED ON A BOARD

There are various duties imposed on a Board to protect the corporation
from harm, including: the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, the duty of
oversight, and the duty of good faith.36 While a Board's priorities and
loyalties are always to its shareholders, a Board must also integrate social
responsibility into its governance model.
Corporate law demands that directors of a corporation always acquire
37
a rudimentary understanding of the business of the corporation.
Directors are not expected to be perfect, but they are expected to exercise
reasonable
care. 3 8 Board
expectations
are context-specific.
Responsibility varies depending on the size of the corporation, the
39
governance structure, and the type of work the corporation engages in.
However, there is one constant obligation imposed on the Board: the
40
obligation to stay informed of the activities of the corporation.
Otherwise, a Board is not effectively "participat[ing] in the overall
management of corporate affairs.'
The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) sets forth the
appropriate conduct for directors. The MBCA requires that a Board act
in the reasonable interests of the corporation, act in good faith, and be
informed regarding its appropriate oversight responsibility.42 Regarding
the first requirement, reasonableness is determined by both a subjective
and objective analysis.43 Reasonability depends on what a Board actually
believed, and is therefore partially subjective. 44 However, reasonableness
is ultimately an objective analysis; the45 inquiry is: what would a
reasonable Board do in a similar situation.
35. See Palkon, 2014 WL 5341880, at *4.
36. Julian Velasco, How Many FiduciaryDutiesAre There in CorporateLaw?, 83 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1231, 1232-33 (2010).

37. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (N.J. 1981).
38. Id. at 822.
39. Id. at 821.
40. Id. at 822.
41. Id.
42. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2002) (courts essentially holding directors
accountable if there is a poor or unreasonable process that went into making a decision under the
circumstances at the time of the decision).
43. Lunn, supra note 14, at 120.
44. Id.
45. See id at 121.
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Courts have implied that directors' responsibilities are not stagnant.
Instead, they constantly evolve to maximize the best interests of the
47
corporation.4 6 Directors have a fiduciary relationship with shareholders.
Shareholders not only expect, but also assume that a Board will exercise
reasonable supervision over the corporation.
A court will not hold directors personally liable even for violating
their fiduciary duties, unless the violation caused harm to the corporation.
In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, the former CEO's sons assumed
responsibility for operating the corporation after the death of their
father. 48 The sons borrowed corporate funds for personal use, failed to
pay them back, thereby converting corporate funds into their own trust
accounts. 49 During the entire time period, their mother, Mrs. Pritchard,
was a majority shareholder and member of the Board. She claimed to be
absolved from liability for her sons' actions due to her illnesses and old
age.5° The court opined that the Board should not incur liability unless
the Board's actions are the proximate cause of the alleged harm.51 In
holding Mrs. Pritchard liable, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned
that Ms. Pritchard proximately harmed the corporation because her duties
"extended beyond mere objection and resignation to reasonable attempts
to prevent the misappropriation of the funds."5 2 The court identified a
problem that plagues the modem corporate world - director nonfeasance
presents "a much more difficult causation question" than director
misfeasance.5 3 Misfeasance is performing a duty in a wrongful manner;
nonfeasance implicates the duty to 54become informed before a Board
member takes any action or inaction.
Courts have held directors personally liable in rare situations. For
example, the corporate world was rocked by the decision of Smith v. Van
Gorkom. 55 A shareholder brought a derivative action alleging that the
56
Board failed to sufficiently evaluate the financial benefits of the merger.
46.
47.

Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 396 (Del. Ch. 1961).
Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), af'd,5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).

48.

Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 819 (N.J. 1981

49. Id.
50. Id.at 819-20.
51. Id.at 826.
52. Id.at 827.
53. Id.at 826.
54. Id.(emphasis added).
55. See Jacqueline M. Veneziani, Note, Causation and Injury in Corporate Control
Transactions:Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (1994); see also
Francis, 432 A.2d at n.3 (stating that "Before Van Gorkom was decided, one commentator had
stated that '[tihe search for cases in which directors. . . have been held liable in derivative suits
for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a
very large haystack."' (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
56. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
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The Board approved an offer with a three-day time limit for a cash-out
triangular merger by a subsidiary corporation owned by the Pritzker
Family. 57 The parent company would purchase all of Trans Union's
shares at $55 a share.5 8 The CEO chose this price without consulting
outside market experts. 59 The market price per share at the time of the
offer was $38.60 The Trans Union shareholders favored the offer because
it represented a premium of nearly $17.61 Hence, an overwhelming
majority of shareholders approved the merger. 62 The court found that the
shareholders' approval did not justify the directors' breach because the
shareholders were not informed of the facts regarding the directors'
63
decision to approve a $55 buyout.
The court concluded that the directors breached their fiduciary duties.
The Board's actions were not made with "an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief," that the merger was in the corporation's
best interests. 64 The court reasoned that the directors failed to "inform
themselves of all information reasonably available to them and relevant
to their decision to recommend the Pritzker merger" and "disclose all
material information that a reasonable stockholder would consider
important in deciding whether to approve the merger., 65 The court made
the following findings regarding the Board's behavior: it possessed a
general lack of valuation information; the Board misled and
mischaracterized a report by a financial expert who inflated the true cost
of the shares, and finally, the Board failed to disclose to the shareholders
that Van Gorkom chose the $55 price because it best suited his financial
situation, which was not in the best interests of Trans Union's
shareholders. 66 The decision is all the more stunning because it came
from the Delaware Supreme Court, the leader of American corporate
law. 67 The notion of a director incurring personal liability for monetary

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id. at 867.
See id.at 866.
Id.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 897.

62.

See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 897.

63. See id.at 868.
64. Id.at 872.
65. Id.at 872, 893.
66. Id.at 890-91.
67. Because most corporations are incorporated in Delaware, and its decisions are so
powerfully influential in the realm of corporate governance, the author predominantly will focus
on Delaware law. See Sean O'Sullivan, Del. Courts Celebrated for Corporate Influence:
Magazine Notes Chancery, Supreme Courts' Impact, DELAWAREONLINE (Oct. 24, 2011, 12:03
AM), http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20111024/NEWS/I 10240330/Del-courts-celebrate
d-for-corporateinfluence?odyssey=tab%7Cmostpopular/o7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE ("No other
state court impacts business law to such a profound degree.").
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68
damages was a bombshell on corporations.

A. DoctrinalFlaw #1--Most SLC's Lack CybersecurityAwareness, and
Courts Provide too much Deference to Boards, Thereby Improperly
DismissingNecessary DerivativeActions
A derivative action is a suit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the
corporation for corporate recovery of damages or equitable relief arising
from allegedly unlawful or improper conduct by directors, officers, or
control persons acting under such authority. 69 The corporation is an
indispensable party and is nominally served as the defendant to assure its
appearance. 7 ° The corporation is the real party in interest and the
shareholder is only a nominal plaintiff.7 In a derivative action, the
damages are recovered on behalf of the corporation. In effect, a
because the
shareholder brings suit on behalf of the corporation
72
corporation refuses to bring the action against itself.
The derivative action allows shareholders to protect corporate
interests when the directors refuse to take corrective action.73 A
shareholder cannot bring a derivative proceeding unless it will promote
justice and be in the best interests of the corporation. 74 As a matter of
policy, however, there are many reasons why a corporation would not
want to proceed with a derivative action. First, litigation is timeconsuming and disruptive. Second, the resources a corporation expends
on litigation are wasted if the case is likely to be dismissed. Finally, a
derivative action may require that a corporation divulge confidential
business information in open court that has been intentionally shielded
from the public. While derivative actions serve an important role for
corporate governance accountability, elucidating corporate wrongdoing,
the downside of derivative actions is that they can be frivolous nuisance
suits.
In addition, there are a number of procedural safeguards that a plaintiff
must overcome in order to bring a derivative action. 75 First, a plaintiff
must be a shareholder at the time when the allegedly damaging

68. Bayless Manning, Reflections and PracticalTips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985).
69.

13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS § 5939 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2014).
70. See id. § 5941.10.
71. See id.

72. See id. § 5940.
73.

See id. § 5949.

74. See id.
75.

Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU. L. REV.

353, 362 (2004) ("[D]erivative actions are fraught with difficulties.").
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transaction occurred.76 Second, in a majority of jurisdictions complaints
must make a universal demand, that is, the complaint must be verified by
the court,7 7 and allege with particularity the demand to a Board.78 This
requirement is designed to strike a fair balance between a shareholder's
rights to assert a claim against a Board who fails to uphold its fiduciary
duties and the corporation's right to appoint a Board to manage the
critical decisions for the corporation. 79 A Board must decide whether to
invest corporate resources in pursuit of a shareholder's allegation of
corporate wrongdoing. 80 Thereafter, a Board has a reasonable time to
respond, often 90 days, unless the corporation rejects the demand or the
is not taken swiftly. 8 1
corporation will suffer irreparable injury if action
82
Most claims rarely survive the demand stage.
However, before a complaint reaches a court, a Board may consider
forming a SLC to evaluate causes of action against the corporation.83
These committees are made up of independent 84 and disinterested
directors. 85 The SLC determines whether the lawsuit is in the
"corporation's best interests." 86 The level of deference a court grants a
corporation's SLC varies by jurisdiction. For example, courts in certain
jurisdictions provide tremendous deference to the decision of the SLC; in
other jurisdictions, the court independently scrutinizes the merits of the
derivative action. 87 Most courts provide too much deference to the SLC's
76. See FLETCHER, supra note 69, § 5972.
77. Meaning a shareholder must demonstrate that he exhausted all the means within his
reach to obtain redress of his grievances within the corporation itself.
78. See id.§ 5963. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2014).
79. See FLETCHER, supra note 69, § 5963.
80. See id
81. See id.§ 5967.
82. See generally Ann Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability inShareholder Derivative
Litigation: The Delaware Courts' Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. REV. 589,
597-98 (2008). See also STEPHEN M. BAINBR1DGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICs 362

(2002).
83. See Scarlett, supra note 82, at 598-99.
84. Legislatures typically fail to define the word "independent" in their corporate statutes.
85. Id.at 598.
86. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn't a Rule-The Business Judgment Rule, 36
VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 647-48 (2002) (dismissing a derivative action might increase stock price).
87. In New York, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the deferential presumption of
respect the SLC's, and judicial inquiry is limited. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996,
1001 (N.Y. 1979). Some states also give deferential protection to an SLC recommendation but
reverse the burden from plaintiff to defendant. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors,
729 F.2d 372, 378-79 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that a court should dismiss a derivative action upon
an SLC's recommendation if the defendants show that they reasonably investigated, were
independent, and acted in good faith); Lewis ex. rel. Citizens Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 838 S.W.2d
215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a derivative action should be dismissed only after the
court (1)finds that the committee was independent and (2) critically reviews the committee's
findings to determine whether they are made in good faith, supported by the record of the
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88
decision, resulting in dismissal of "the vast majority of cases."
The first doctrinal problem in the hypothetical corporation is the
composition of the SLC, and the court's improper analysis of the
cybersecurity issues. Post Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, it is poor corporate
89
governance to not have a risk management or assessment team.
Moreover, in this age of technology, a corporation that handles sensitive
information, such as XYZ from the hypothetical above, needs to have a
Board with at least a basic understanding of data protection.9" Many
Board members and chancery judges grew up in a pre-digital era. If a
Board lacks expertise in cybersecurity matters, then to remedy the
information technology gap a Board should outsource these issues to a
private data security firm or to attorneys with data breach compliance
expertise. Following the bare minimum requirements is no longer
acceptable corporate policy. Information technology is becoming
increasingly embedded in overall corporate strategy. In order to bridge
the information technology gap, affirmative efforts must be taken to
become knowledgeable about cybersecurity.
Within a few years, a lack of Internet access and technology ignorance
will doom those who "lament[ing] the decline of print media, longing for

the good old days." 9 ' Many Baby Boomers are not comfortable with or

proficient at using new computer technology. These typical Board
members do not understand the importance of data encryption,
cybersecurity, or firewalls. Cyberlaw represents a foreign environment
of communication
for individuals who are trying to learn new languages
92
and understand the importance of cybereducation.
Growth in the usage of the Internet and associated technology is
continuously evolving; accessing the "Internet of Things" has
transitioned from desktops to mobile devices. 93 However, Baby Boomers,
who comprise most Boards, are reluctant to embrace technology. In
contrast, Millennials consider technology to be an integral function of
society. Almost 60% of Baby Boomers do not use a cell phone
investigation, and are consistent with the best interests of the corporation). In Delaware, by
contrast, the defendant bears the burden, and the court may apply its own business judgment as to
whether the case should be dismissed. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787-89 (Del.
1981).
88. Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative
Litigation: The ALl Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1339, 1356-58 (1993).
89. See Lunn, supra note 14, at 114.
90. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981).
91. Ira Wolfe, A DigitalDivide Grows Between Baby Boomers... and Other Boomers?,
HUFF. POST TECH. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:15 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ira-wolfe/babyboomers-technologyb_1663751 .html.

92.

Id.

93. John Greenough, The Internet of Everything: 2015, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2015,
5:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/i ntemet-of-everything-2015-bi-2014-12.
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password. 94 Nearly 20% of those who use a password report that they fail
to protect it. 95 The digital divide between Baby Boomers and Millennials
may account for the absence of adequate corporate cybersecurity
protection.
Additionally, the primary reason corporations create a SLC is to
provide a gate keeping function. The SLCs prevent nuisance suits and
wasting of corporate funds. However, most of the concerns the SLC is
designed to prevent are absent from the hypothetical. Sammy
Shareholder's allegations do not lack merit. In fact, the stock price
dropped significantly when the company disclosed the hack that resulted
in stolen information. Had the company taken adequate measures to
disclose the cyberintrusions earlier or taken proactive measures to
remedy the situation, a derivative action could have been avoided.
Indeed, the ultimate drop in stock price would not have been so
catastrophic.
Courts must carefully scrutinize a SLC's recommendation with regard
to handling a derivative action. A claim alleging a breach of fiduciary
duty for inadequate cybersecurity planning will inevitably survive the
impenetrable SLC and withstand the procedural hoops of the motion to
dismiss. The adverse effects and costs of doing business with a poor
cybersecurity infrastructure will need to be internalized. The courts must
force corporations to revamp their governance structure to account for
information technology security. Furthermore, Boards must adapt and
stay ahead of the digital divide by learning about the evolving
cyberenvironment in order to prosper and remain competitive.
B. DoctrinalFlaw #2: What are a Director'sFiduciaryDuties
Regarding Oversight in the Context of Cybersecurity? The Duties
Remain Unclear,Since Courtshave Avoided Addressing the Issue
In Re: Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation was a
landmark decision that rejected old case law that shielded directors from
personal liability for breaching their fiduciary duty of care. Caremark
provided health care services to patients who were referred by
physicians.96 Federal law prevented corporations like Caremark from
making referral payment arrangements with physicians. 97 Caremark was
indicted for violating this law.98 However, the court held that the evidence
94. Baby Boomers Need to Become More Educated About Digital Security, Bus. WIRE
(Oct. 1, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.business wire.com/news/home/20121001005449/en/BabyBoomers-Educated-Digital-Security#.VTfQLxPF9fx.
95. Id.
96. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 962 (Del. Ch. 1996).
97. Id.
98. ld at 963. It should be noted that Caremark took several steps upon notice of being
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and facts in the record "did not support" the claim that defendants either
"lacked good faith" in their oversight responsibilities, or "consciously
permitted" the corporation to violate the law.99 Previous cases protected
directors from incurring liability. Boards could intentionally ignore
learning about wrongdoing within the corporation.' 00 The court engaged
in a rhetorical debate that rejected the axiom "hear no evil, see no evil,"
seeking to avoid liability, in response to the holding
for future directors
01
Graham:'
from
Can it be said today that, absent some ground giving rise to
suspicion of violation of law, that corporate directors have no duty
to assure that a corporate information gathering and reporting
systems exists which represents a good faith attempt to provide
senior management and the Board with information respecting
material acts, events or conditions within the corporation,
statutes and regulations? I
including compliance with10applicable
2
certainly do not believe so.
The court's reasoning reflected a departure from outdated theories of
duty of care and introduced the concept of "red flags" and oversight to
the duty of care.' 0 3 Although a Board has no duty to install and operate
an elaborate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which it has
no reason to suspect to exist, "a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight - such as an utterfailure to attempt to assure
a reasonable information and reporting system [exists] - will establish
the lack of goodfaith that is a necessary condition to liability." 104
Caremarkestablished the precedent that directors have a legal duty to
not only create compliance programs, but also ensure that they are
effective. This is particularly significant for directors in large diversified
companies. Like the BJR, the duty to monitor is a judicially created
standard, not codified in state statutes. For example, a director of a
nuclear power corporation should be aware of the impact that dumping
investigated by the DOJ in 1992. Caremark essentially restructured its entire corporate policy and
maintained both an internal audit and external audit committee. See id. Finally, Caremark
increased management supervision. See id.
99. Id. at 972.
100. Cf Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
101. Id. at 126 (holding that the plaintiff failed to show that any director had actual
knowledge of anti-trust activities by corporate employees or any actual knowledge of any facts,
which should have put them on notice that anti-trust activities were being carried on). The Court
reasoned, "in [the] absence of knowledge of suspicious circumstances" the directors were not
liable despite failing to take action designed to learn of and prevent the illegal activities). Id.
102. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969 (emphasis added).
103. Lunn, supra note 14, at 122.
104. Caremark,698 A.2d at 971 (emphasis added).
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waste could have on a local river's ecosystem. The BJR will not shield a
director who has not investigated or determined whether corrective action
is needed when the company violates a chemical dumping law. Moreover,
if the director allows this practice to persist for years, then he will not be
afforded protection for his behavior. This director could be found liable
under a breach of a duty of oversight.
As noted in dicta of Caremark, a claim of inadequate oversight is,
"possibly the most difficult theory in corporate law upon which a plaintiff
might hope to win ajudgment." 05 Despite this reality, the author suggests
that the same logic for director oversight can easily be extended to
cybersecurity violations. With the frequency and magnitude of data
breaches, it has become necessary for Boards to establish a risk
management assessment procedure to help identify cyberattacks.
Identifying the doctrinal flaw from the hypothetical XYZ Corporation
is a misunderstanding of the duty of care by both the Board and the court.
Whether due to fear of litigation or because it is required by law, Boards
will encounter growing cybersecurity threats. Legal responses to
cybersecurity allegations should take the form of increased
cybersecurity-oversight duties and the associated threat of potential
liability. Compliance professionals should inform directors of the
necessary steps to take to protect the company and its shareholders.
In view of the extensive damage that recent attacks have caused to
major companies, a Board will no longer be able to hide behind its own
ignorance. For example, in 2008 Heartland Payment Systems'
(Heartland) was hacked, resulting in the loss of over 100 million
individuals credit card and personal information, marking one of the
largest data breaches in U.S. history.' 06
1 Heartland paid legal fees owed to
over 650 financial institutions including MasterCard, Discover and Visa,
as well as costs related to the data breach, ultimately losing nearly $140
million.' 0 7 Also, in 2011, Sony was the victim of a cyberattack. The Sony
breach generated negative publicity for the company and illuminated the
105.

Id.at 967.

106. Norah C. Avellan, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Growing Need
for Cybersecurity in Modern Corporate America, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 193, 200 (2014); see
also Juliet M. Moringiello, Warranting DataSecurity, 5 BROOK. J.CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 63, 6768 (2010); Rachael King, Lessons from the Data Breach at Heartland,BLOOMBERG (July 6,

2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-07-06/lessons-from-the-data-breach-at-heart
landbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice;
Brian
Krebs, Payment
Processor Breach May Be Largest Ever, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://voices.

washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/01/payment_processor-breach-mayb.html
(the
Heartland Payment Systems breach, though immense, was not the first of its kind).
107. See Moringiello, supra note 106, at 68; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D.
Schwartz, MasterCard and Visa Investigate Data Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2012),

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/31 /business/mastercard-and-visa-look-into-possible-attack.h
tml.
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global impact of hacking.' 0 8 The attack resulted in the loss of 77 million
Sony customers' personal information internationally.' °9 By failing to
encrypt this information, Sony was a ripe target for an inevitable
cyberattack.11 0 Sony did not announce the breach immediately to its
customers and shareholders.' 1 Sony's stock value dropped a total of 7%
following public disclosure of the magnitude and impact of the event. 2
Experts estimate that between the litigation-related expenses, the damage
caused by the attack, and the necessary implementation of an identity
theft program to prevent future attacks, it will ultimately cost Sony an
estimated $10 billion. 113
Finally, the most recent Target Corporation data breach highlights
another important lesson for Boards and companies. Where Sony was
unprepared for a cyberattack, lacking any type of security measures,
Target allegedly had protections in place, but simply failed to react
appropriately to the breach. 1 4 The breach not only resulted in lawsuits
brought by customers and shareholders, but it also led to the resignation
of Target's CEO.11 5 The hackers remotely installed malware that targeted
the processing system for Target's credit cards." 6 Although Target had
108. Lance Bonner, Cyber Risk: How the 2011 Sony Data Breach and the Needfor Cyber
Risk Insurance Policies Should Direct the Federal Response to Rising Data Breaches, 40 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 257, 258 (2012).
109. See Nick Caplin, PlayStationNetwork and Qriocity Outage FAQ, PLAYSTATION BLOG
(Apr. 28, 2011, 2:28 AM), http://blog.eu.play station.com/2011/04/28/playstation-network-andqriocity-outage-faq/.
Gaming Security Breach: "Only on
Williams LLP,
110. See Hunton &
28, 2011), https://www.huntonprivacy
(Apr.
L.
BLOG
SECURITY
&
INFO.
PRIVACY
PlayStation?,"
blog.com/2011/04/articles/gaming-security-breach-only-on-playstation/.
I11. Martyn Williams, PlayStationNetwork Hack Timeline, PCWORLD (May 1,2011, 7:30
AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 226802/playstation networkhacktimeline.html; Dan
Mitchell, Yet Another Hack, Yet Another Delay in Reporting it, FORTUNE (June 9, 2011, 7:57 PM),
(noting that
http://fortune.com/2011/06/09/yet-another-hack-yet-another-delay-in-reporting-it/
Sony and Citigroup both stalled for more than a week before formally disclosing to the public
cyberincidents affecting their corporations); see also Patrick Seybold, Update on PSN Service
Outages, PLAYSTATION BLOc (Apr. 20, 2011), http://blog.us.playstation.com/2011/04/20/
update-on-psn-service-outages-2/ (noting that Sony stated that it was "aware" its systems were
offline, but did not offer its users a reason).
112. Avellan, supra note 106, at 201.
113. See Richard J. Bortnick, "Anonymous" Hacks PlayStationNetwork andSony Feels the
Pain, CYBER INQUIRER (May 6, 2011, 6:09 PM), http://cyberinquirer.com/2011/05/06/
"anonymous"-hacks-playstation-network-and-sony-feels-the-pain/.
114. See Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit CardNumbers:
How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK: TECH. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.business
week.com/articles/20 14-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-credit-card-data.
115. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Target Corp., PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec.
13, 2013), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach-asc?title--target+corp (last visited Oct. 25,
2014).
116. Andrea Peterson, Secret Service Estimates Type of Malware that Led to TargetBreach
is Affecting 1,000 US. Businesses, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
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employed a cybersecurity firm that alerted Target to the presence of a
potential and likely breach, Target failed to react swiftly and
appropriately." 7 Between 70 and 100 million customers were affected by
this breach. 1 8 Target's stock value decreased over 9% as a result of this
breach. 9
Despite the proliferation of cyberattacks, no derivative action brought
by a shareholder against a Board for breach of cyberfiduciary duty has
succeeded. In fact, no derivative actions or securities related data breach
actions in the context of cybersecurity have. survived a motion to
20
dismiss.'
Current technology mandates that directors focus on the steps they
take to ensure the protection of sensitive corporate data. The XYZ Board
had no policy regarding cybersecurity risk management, and barely
possessed a rudimentary understanding of technology, let alone data
protection. Further, the XYZ Board had actual knowledge that its
sensitive data may have been compromised, even if nothing was
technically stolen. The failure by the Board to disclose this type of
12 1
information to shareholders qualifies as a material misrepresentation.
The material misrepresentation standard asks "whether a reasonable
investor [or shareholder in this case], in the exercise of due care, would
' 22
have been misled by [the misrepresentation]. "1
Cyberattacks are now a corporate reality. A Board should assume that
data is being or will be compromised, and improve their security
measures accordingly. A Board's lack of expertise on cybersecurity
matters will soon no longer shield it from the requirement to implement
a competent monitoring system. "Just as financial controls were not
universally understood by directors, pre Sarbanes-Oxley and Enron, that
com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/22/secret-service-estimates-type-of-malware-that-led-totarget-breach-is-affecting-over- 1000-u-s-businesses/.
117. See Riley et al., supra note 114.
118. Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow, N.Y.
TIMEs (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70million-customers.html.
119. Dhanya Skariachan & Jim Finkle, Target Shares Recover After Reassurance on Data
Breach Impact, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2014, 1:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/
us-target-results-idUSBREA1 POWC20140226.
120. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2009); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F.
Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Miele v. Carr, No. 309-cv-04687, 2009 WL 5864279, at * I (D.N.J.
2009); In re Target Corporate S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 14-cv-00203 (D. Minn. Jan. 21,
2014); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1317-18 (2011); Janus Capital
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2301-03 (2011); Greenberg v. Crossroads
Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 663-65 (5th Cir. 2004); In re Novatel Wireless Sec. Litig., 830 F. Supp.
2d 996, 1019 (S.D. Cal. 2011).
121. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968).
122. Id. at 863.
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lack of a firm grasp of financial controls did not mean that oversight was
not required, but rather that the oversight lacked attention and expertise,
which was later addressed through regulationand litigation.'' 123 Whereas
a Board is not required to act perfectly, it must act reasonably under the
circumstances. XYZ's Board did not act reasonably, and breached its
fiduciary duty of care due to its failure to implement adequate
cybersecurity measures.
C. DoctrinalFlaw #3: Misunderstandingthe BJR
Investing in a corporation carries a number of assumed risks.
Corporate law seeks to stimulate risk-taking, innovation, and
entrepreneurship among Boards.124 Shareholders expect that a Board will
make sound business judgments in the best financial interests of the
corporation. At the same time, scholars recognize the fundamental
a
unfairness in praising a Board for favorable results, but criticizing
25
Board merely because their decisions led to undesirable results. 1
The BJR creates a presumption that directors have acted in good
faith. 126 It protects directors from liability for violating good faith, unless
a plaintiff shareholder is able to overcome the presumption of good faith
17
by proof of: conflict of interest, illegality, fraud, or bad faith.'
Consequently, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden of proof to overcome
the presumption. 128 Courts have found that a plaintiff overcomes the BJR
only when gross29negligence or other highly improper conduct by a Board
can be proven.1
The BJR is not the rule of conduct; it is only a presumption of good
faith, and not a presumption of compliance with the duty of care. 130 The
123. Lunn, supra note 14, at 114.
124. Experimental Economics Center, Decision-Making Under Uncertainty-lBasic
Concepts, ECONPORT, http://www.econport.org/econport/request?page=man ru basics4 (last
visited Mar. 5, 2015); see also, Manuel Nunez Nickel & Manuel Cano Rodriguez, A Review of
Research on the Negative Accounting Relationship Between Risk and Return: Bowman's

Paradox, 30 OMEGA 1, 1 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S030504830100055X.
125. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruledby Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (indicating that it is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors act on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was in the
best interests of the company).
126. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 261.
127. See Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. &
MARY Bus. L. REV. 521, 525 (2013).
128. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc. (Cede 11), 634 A.2d 345,361 (Del. 1993), modified on
other grounds, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
129. Cede 11, 634 A.2d at 361
130.

MELVIN EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS: CASES

AND MATERIALS 544-49 (8th ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
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rule of conduct that a Board must comply with is the duty of care.
Although it would seem unlikely that a Board could have acted in good
faith and failed their duty of care, the BJR does not protect against
liability under duty of loyalty grounds.' 3 1 The predicate for the BJR to
32
apply is that the directors must make an informed business judgment. 1
A Board cannot hide behind the heavy presumption
of the BJR if its
33
decision.'
business
rational
a
make
not
do
directors
Yet, why should a Board be entitled to such broad deference and a
presumption that it acted properly? Judge Ralph Winter of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals defended the policy underlying the BJR in the
acclaimed case of Joy v. North. First, Judge Winter reasoned that
shareholders voluntarily undertake the risk of bad judgment, as they have
chosen to invest in a company partly on the basis of its management.' 34
Second, courts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is an imperfect
device to evaluate corporate business decisions. 135 Finally, because
potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, overly cautious
36
corporate decisions may ultimately harm shareholders.'
The proper application of the BJR remains misunderstood.' 3 7 There is
often a lack of consensus among the courts on the correct application of
this rule.' 38 As the nature and complexity of both corporate transactions
and technology evolve, it will become more difficult to apply the BJR. 139
Finally, this rule touches at the heart of corporate governance - attempting
to strike the ideal balance between directors' legal authority to manage
the corporation and shareholders' right to hold a Board accountable for
1 40
its actions.

131. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83,90 (2004).
132. See Eisner, 746 A.2d at 258; In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch.

1996).
133.

See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975 (Del. 1977).

134.
135.

Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
Id. at 886; see also Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 114-15
[Tihere is a substantial risk that suing shareholders and reviewing judges will be
unable to distinguish between competent and negligent management because bad
outcomes often will be regarded, ex post, as having been foreseeable and,
therefore, preventable ex ante. If liability from bad outcomes, without regard to
the ex-ante quality of the decision or the decision-making process, however,
managers will be discouraged from taking risks.

Id.
136. North, 692 F.2d at 886.
137. McMillan, supra note 127, at 526.
138.

Id.

139. See id
140. Id.
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The third doctrinal problem identified in the hypothetical XYZ
Corporation is a very common misapplication of the BJR. The XYZ
Board cannot hide behind the favorable presumption that it acted in the
best interest of the corporation. The Board failed to make an informed
business decision, let alone a rational one. "Data security and information
governance are increasingly part of the board-level communications ' as
4
the centrality of information to enterprises continues to grow."' '
Cybersecurity is becoming ubiquitous in the United States, paired with
abounding opportunities to incur potential liability. 142 XYZ's Board
lacked a comprehensive cybersecurity risk management assessment
procedure. The absence of these programs constitutes an egregious
violation of its fiduciary duties, rising to the level of gross negligence.
The author also contends that courts should presumptively find that a
Board operated in bad faith for ignoring the practical realities of data
breaches and cybersecurity.
Additionally, even if the judge in the hypothetical found that XYZ did
not violate its duty of care, the judge allowed the BJR to subsume the
duty of loyalty. The BJR only grants a presumption against breaching the
duty of care and provides no protection for a Board that acts in bad faith.
The judge's error closely resembles that of the court in Shlensky v.
Wrigley.
In Shlensky, a shareholder brought a derivative action against the
Wrigley Family's corporation, which owned the Chicago Cubs. 143 The
shareholder alleged that the Cubs were losing profits because of a lack of
stadium lighting, preventing the Cubs from playing night games. 144 The
shareholder's theory alleged that this failure by the Board breached the
duty of care. 145 The appellate court erred in affirming the lower court's
denial of the motion to dismiss. "We are not satisfied that the motives
assigned to [Wrigley] and through him to the other directors, are contrary
to the best interests of the corporation and the stockholders." 146 "The
decision is one properly before directors and the motives alleged in the
amended complaint showed no147fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in
their making of that decision."'
The court in Shlensky, like the judge in the XYZ Corporation
hypothetical, ignored the company's duty of care, and justified the
Board's action based on the BJR. The rule is not a presumption against
fraud, illegality, conflict of interest, or bad faith. It cannot be applied if
141.
142.

See Procter, supra note 34.
Id.

143.

Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 777 (Il. App. Ct. 1968).

144.

at 776-77.
See id.

145.

See id.

146.

Id.at 780.

147.

Id.
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the directors do not properly make a decision with facts in front of them.
Unlike the shareholder in Shlensky, Sammy alleged both a breach of duty
of loyalty and breach of duty of care.
D. DoctrinalFlaw #4: Misunderstandingof the Duty of Good Faithand
Duty of Loyalty in the Context of OversightLiability
1. Duty of Loyalty
Another judicially created doctrine that underpins the confusion in
resolving derivative actions is the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty,
48
like the BJR, is not codified in any statute, but evolved from trust law. 1
The duty of loyalty is essentially a "boy scout oath" for a Board. Directors
and officers are charged with the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests
of the corporation at all times and not for their personal wealth. 149 This
duty includes safely managing the corporation's assets on behalf of the
shareholders. 50 It is critical to understand that the BJR does not protect
a Board when a shareholder alleges a violation of the duty of loyalty. 151
2. Duty of Good Faith
The Delaware Supreme Court attempted to clarify the confusion
surrounding the various duties of a Board with respect to corporate
governance. In In Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation(Disney), the
court explored the uncharted waters of good faith and how it should be
assessed in the context of a Board's other fiduciary duties. The court
clarified that while gross negligence (including a failure to be properly
informed of all available material facts) can establish a breach of duty of
care, without additional wrongful conduct, gross negligence cannot
constitute bad faith. 152 Although philosophically the concept of good
faith overlaps 53
with due care, these are two distinct legal duties in
corporate law.'

The Disney court justified distinguishing a breach of fiduciary duty of
care and bad faith by showing how merging good faith into the duty of
care would undermine legislative intent. As a matter of good public
policy and fairness, no corporate statute allows exculpatory provisions

148. See generally Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
149. Historically, the duty of loyalty was associated with situations involving a Boards'
conflict of interest and the corporate opportunity doctrine.
150. Id.

151. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000). The business judgment
rule only insulates a Board decision from judicial scrutiny as long as, a Board acts in good faith.
152. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006).
153.

Id.
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for conduct that is exercised in bad faith.' 5 4 However, exculpatory
provisions do provide significant protection to directors for monetary
liability arising from breach of the duty of care. 15 5 By converting bad faith
into all violations of duty of care, exculpatory provisions would provide
no protection and the BJR would be fruitless.156 Therefore, the court ruled
that bad faith is not gross negligence. 157 Acting in bad faith does not
violate the duty of care. 158 The court articulated many scenarios that
would constitute bad faith:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where
the director intentionally acts with a purpose contrary to advancing
the best interests of the corporation, acts with the intent to violate
the law, or intentionally fails to act in the59face of a known duty to
act, consciously disregarding his duties. 1
However, the court did not discuss oversight liability.
IV. CURRENT

STATE OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES

The Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter confronted the
difficult question Disney avoided addressing-whether a violation of the
duty to act in good faith is a basis for the direct imposition of liability.
The majority concluded that bad faith is a condition for director oversight
liability. 160 The court reaffirmed Disney, but simultaneously clarified the
conflict between the duties of care, good faith, and loyalty effectively
overruling Caremark. The court held that because good faith is a
"subsidiary element" of the duty of loyalty, the fiduciary duty violated by
16 1
acting in bad faith is the duty of loyalty.
Stone had a major impact on the corporate world. First, it reiterated
the notion that the duties of good faith, loyalty, and care do not operate
as a "triad of fiduciary duties." The obligation to act in good faith is not
an independent fiduciary duty.162 Second, the court greatly expanded the
notion of the duty of loyalty beyond simply financial or personal conflict
154.

DGCL § 102(b)(7) does not permit eliminating personal liability for breaches of the

duty of care if the underlying acts or omissions were not in good faith. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §
102(b)(7)(ii)(2015).
155. See generally id.
156. Disney, 906 A.2d at 66-67.

157.

Id. at 64-66.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at64.
Id. at 67.
Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).
Id. at370.
Id.
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of interest transactions and simultaneously limited oversight. The duty of
loyalty now encompasses all cases, including allegations of oversight,
where a Board acts in bad faith. 163 The decision implicitly challenged all
Boards to restructure their corporate governance. Directors should no
longer operate passively, waiting for red flags to arise. Directors should
actively engage in information-gathering techniques to discover
problems before they arise and implement preventive solutions.
There are now two bases upon which a plaintiff shareholder can bring
an oversight claim.' 64 First, by showing that a Board completely failed to
establish an information or reporting system.' 65 Second, by
demonstrating that a Board consciously failed to oversee or enforce such
a system. 166 For both scenarios, a plaintiff must prove that the directors
were aware that they
failed their fiduciary duties in order for a court to
67
hold them liable.1
The doctrinal flaw reflected in the XYZ hypothetical demonstrates an
application of bad faith. Despite the Stone ruling above, the author
contends that whether an individual brings an oversight claim under
breach of duty of care or duty of loyalty should be irrelevant to the
analysis of the merits of a derivative cybersecurity claim against a Board.
Today, systematic lack of data breach detection and prevention is bad
faith in the cybersecurity context. Courts must not become consumed by
form, but should instead focus on the substance of a claim. Boards like
that of XYZ can no longer hide behind the BJR for such a conscious
disregard of the best interests of the corporation. Boards now must take
an active role in corporate information technology governance.
The XYZ Board erred in its disregard for the potential breaches. With
the magnitude of cyberattacks and the fallout that results, defending on
the grounds that no financial harm actually occurred is insufficient.
Victims may not immediately feel intangible harm from the disclosure of
sensitive material, such as credit card or social security information.
However, the effects are devastating when analyzing the impact on the
financial lives of the sports team members. The burden placed on the
members includes dealing with the ramifications of identity theft. It may
take years to clean up their credit history. Moreover, unlike a credit card,
a victim of a stolen social security number cannot simply cancel their
number and order a new social security card. The theft of a social security
68
number by a hacker can carry grave repercussions.1
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Rich ex rel. Fuqi Intern., Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 981 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.

168. See generally Amber Newby, The Consequences of Your SocialSecurity Number Being
Stolen, BESTriDTHEFTCOMPANYS.COM (Feb. 28, 2014), http://bestidtheftcompanys.com/2014/
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Courts have tremendous influence over prevailing corporate
governance practices. 169 Judges' opinions and commentary from scholars
evaluating those opinions help shape norms and practices that ultimately
influence Board behavior.17 0 As courts continue to decide data breach
cases, and as legal scholars assess the impact of these decisions, there will
be a corporate governance cybersecurity metamorphosis. Only when
judges begin speaking out about the importance of a Board's duty to
the rest of society push to expand the scope of the duty to
monitor will
71
monitor.1
A. DoctrinalSolution #1: Boards must Become Educatedon
Cybermatters, and Courts must Independently Scrutinize Derivative
Actions and not Blindly Accept all SLC Recommendations
In Palkon, Judge Chesler properly evaluated the Wyndham SLC's
position that the shareholder derivative action be dismissed. 172 Unlike the
judge in the XYZ Corporation hypothetical, Judge Chesler did not blindly
adopt the SLC's findings. Instead, he opined that the committee's
investigation had a predetermined conclusion, 173 specifically noting the
numerous steps the Wyndham Board took to familiarize itself with the
cybersecurity and risk assessment at
data breaches by discussing
74
numerous meetings. 1
Due to the frequency of data breach stories in the news, directors will
not be able to claim that they were "unaware of the risks posed to their
[corporations] by cyberattacks."1 75 Because of the limelight that

the-consequences-of-your-social-security-number-being-stolen.
169. EricJ. Pan, A Board's Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 717, 740 (2010).
see, e.g., Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verret, Delaware's Guidance: Ensuring Equity
170. Id.;
for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 189 (2007) (highlighting the influence of
Delaware judges' extrajudicial activities on corporate law and norms); E. Norman Veasey &
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governancefrom
1992-2004? A Retrospective of Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1404-07
(2005) (arguing that "judges have had a substantial role in shaping best practices in corporate
governance" and "speeches and articles by Delaware judges are often helpful in guiding boards
and their counsel in the direction of best practices").
171. Pan, supra note 169, at 741.
172. See generally Palkon v. Holmes, No. 14-cv-01234, 2014 WL 5341880 (D.N.J. Oct. 20,

2014).
173.
174.
175.

Id. at *2
Id.
Steven L. Caponi, Cybersecurity and the Board of Directors: Avoiding Personal

Liability--Part I of III, REUTERS (July 25, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatoryforum/2013/07/25/cybersecurity-and-the-board-of-directors-avoiding-personal-liabiity-part-iof-iii/; Paul A. Ferrillo, Cyber Governance: What Every Director Needs to Know, HARv. LAW
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 5, 2014, 9:23 AM), http://blogs.law.
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cybersecurity is currently receiving, Boards should not be able to claim
that an attack and the resulting harm was unknown. 176 The global state of
cybersecurity now classifies corporations into two categories: "those who
' 177
have been hacked, and those that don't know they've been hacked.'
In responding to a data breach or cyberattack, corporate officers and
directors can learn a number of important lessons from the Palkon
dismissal. The law places an affirmative obligation of oversight on
directors to manage significant risks looming over a corporation's
sensitive data. 178 A reasonable Board will hold meetings to address
breaches or attacks on their sensitive data. 1 79 Boards that are unfamiliar
with cybersecurity or data breaches would be wise to employ outside
counsel for advice on limiting legal liability.' 8 0 Finally, it is critical that
a Board take necessary remedial measures to address a breach and
minimize the harm that can result from exposure.' 8' In light of the
likelihood of a cyberattack, the appropriate time to address a cyberattack
is before it occurs.1 82 Boards can mitigate liability by having robust
preventative policies and a response team in place in case a breach does
occur. 183

B. PotentialSolutions to DoctrinalFlaws #2, #3, and #4:
CorporationsMust Revamp Their Governance Structure to Accountfor
Cybersecurity Concerns
The tort law case TJ Hooper demonstrates the reasoning directors
should employ to implement protective measures to avoid incurring
liability for data breaches.' 8 4 In that case, a tugboat was caught in a
vicious storm, which caused it to sink.1 8 5 Although radio systems on boats
were a recent technological development in the 1930s, radios were both
relatively inexpensive and available. 186 Had the tugboat been equipped
with a radio, the boat would have easily been able to receive warnings
176. Caponi, supra note 175.
177. See Nicole Perlroth, Cybercriminals Zero in on a Lucrative New Target: Hedge
Funds, N.Y.TIMES (June 19, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/cybercri
minals-zero-in-on-a-lucrative-new-target-hedge-funds/?_php--true&_type-blogs & r=0.
178. Id.
179. Jan P. Levine et al., D&O's Best Defense Against Shareholder Demands Over
Cybersecurity, ADVISEN (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.cyberrisknetwork.com/201 5/01/07/dos-bestdefense-shareholder-demands-cybersecurity/.
180. Id.
181.

Id.

182.

Id.

183.

Id.

184.
185.

Lunn, supra note 14, at 18.
See generally T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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in-the-1930s/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
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about the storm and avoid it. 187 The operator of the boat argued that he
should not be liable because it was not industry standard to equip boats
with radios at the time. 188 Judge Learned Hand rejected his argument,
reasoning that any objectively reasonable tugboat operator would have a
radio to receive weather reports.' 8 9 Objective reasonableness of industry
practices changes quicker than industry standards when a given industry
is exposed to new technology because companies are opposed to higher
costs, unbeknownst that a court will deem those costs reasonable.
The lesson from T.. Hooper can be analogized to the world of
cyberlaw and director oversight, because the technologies and risks
associated with breach-related issues continue to evolve. Judge Learned
Hand applied his famous formulation to determine what is reasonable in
light of breach. If the burden (B) necessary to prevent a negative result is
less than the probability of harm (P) multiplied by the likelihood (L) or
gravity of harm, then the actions taken are not reasonable.' 90 While no
federal law currently penalizes a Board for the failure to implement
cybersecurity measures (similar to the tugboat operator in T. Hooper),
this fact should not relieve a Board from potential liability when it suffers
a data breach.
Although not a "cybercase," a recent decision from the Third Circuit
19 1
Court of Appeals provides a cautionary regulatory tale for Boards.
Lemington sets forth a warning for all fiduciaries that recognize
governmental and organizational risks but fail to address them
adequately.' 92 In Lemington, a non-profit nursing home sought
bankruptcy protection and closed because of service deficiencies and
financial troubles. 193 A committee of unsecured creditors filed an action
against the directors claiming breaches of fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care. 194 The Third Circuit found that the directors and officers failed to
to remain in office
exercise reasonable care in allowing the fiduciaries
95
clear.
became
mismanagement
after their
The court was particularly perturbed by the fact that the Board sought
and obtained a $178,000 grant to replace the current administrator and
despite repeated knowledge of the administrator's poor performance the

187. See generally Hooper, 60 F.2d at 737.
188. See id. at 739.
189. Id. at 740.
190. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
191. See generally In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620 (3d Cir. 2015).
192. Richik Sarkar, A CautionaryCyber-Liability/RegulatoryTalefor Boards, Officers, and
Directors, Bus. ADvoC. (Mar 26, 2015, 12:54 PM), https://businessadvocate.mcdonald

hopkins.con/Data-Privacy-Solutions/2015/03/26/lemington.
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Lemington, 777 F.3d at 626.
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Board simply never utilized the funds for that purpose. 96 Additionally,
the directors concealed the Board's decision to deplete the patient census
and close the home for over three months. 97 Finally, during the
bankruptcy process, the Board "failed to disclose in its monthly operating
reports that the Home had received a $1.4 million Nursing Home
Assessment Tax Payment . . . [which] damaged the Home's financial

viability after it had become insolvent."' 198 The court specifically noted,
"[t]his [was] not a case where directors, acting in good faith reliance on
information and reports prepared by others, made a rational business
decision."' 99 Rather, the directors had "actual knowledge of
mismanagement, yet stuck their heads in the sand in the face of repeated
signs that residents were receiving severely deficient care." 200 Lemington
is an example of the legal analysis that courts must conduct when a valid
cybersecurity
allegation is brought against a Board for breach of fiduciary
20 1
duty.

This Note argues that a Board cannot wait to take action until the
corporation is attacked, but instead it has an affirmative obligation to stay
informed so that it can take preventative measures. The failure to
recognize red flags in a corporation's data security measures, such as a
potential intrusion, unusual activity, or even a virus, should not per se
establish a violation of a Board's fiduciary duties. However, a failure to
implement a reasonable system to understand the warnings and resolve
them in a manner to protect the best interests of the corporation should
form the basis for gross negligence and constitute bad faith. A detection
system for red flags is only the first step in ensuring good information
technology compliance to avoid liability. The risk management system
implemented by a Board must be designed with teeth, meaning it is no
longer sufficient to just identify potential breaches and disclose them. The
lesson from Palkon is that despite an increased fear of a flood of
cybersecurity oversight liability claims, a Board can be hacked and still
act reasonably and be entitled to the protections of the BJR, as long as a
Board proves it treated cybersecurity as seriously as any other typical
20 2
issue within corporate governance.
The extent of "reasonable" cybersecurity measures necessary to
protect data will depend on the size and value of the data, the financial
capabilities of the corporation, and the impact of previous attacks. 203 The
196.
197.

Id. at 629.
Id.at 630.

198.
199.

Id. at630-31.
Id. at 629.

200. Id. at 630.
201. Sarkar, supra note 192.
202. Id.(emphasis added).
203. Lunn, supra note 14, at 132.
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reasonableness of a Board's actions to avoid liability for oversight may
change daily in the cybersecurity context; 20 4 "what is sufficient oversight
[one day] may quickly become obsolete [the next]."2 °5 Therefore, a Board
must be proactive in addressing cybersecurity issues.
Despite the seemingly uncontrollable and evolving nature of
cybermatters, corporations must begin to recognize that information
technology risks are at least as important as any other business risks that
a Board may face. 20 6 A Board can implement a number of measures to
help survive a derivative claim brought by a shareholder alleging a breach
of fiduciary duty for cybersecurity oversight. Along with preventive
measures, Boards must also focus on damage control following an attack.
These measures are also consistent with good corporate governance.
First, similar to the formula from TJ. Hooper, Boards must apply a
general cost benefit analysis to cybersecurity. As previously
demonstrated, the probability of a cyberattack is great, and it is accepted
that serious harm will result from such an attack. "You can't open a
newspaper or visit an online news site these days without some mention
of a cyberattack or data breach. 20 7 Therefore, Boards must implement a
risk management component to corporate governance. "If the loss
probability multiplied by the loss event value exceeds the burden
(mitigation costs) such mitigations should be implemented., 20 8 A Board's
policy must not only be highly responsive to red flags, but must also be
so that the directors are constantly educated about cyberbreaches.
Second, if a corporation has previously suffered a cyberattack,
directors are not only on notice, but are also expected to be absolutely
vigilant in protecting the company in the future. The author
acknowledges that after one attack, it may be difficult to thwart another.
If an attack is so novel that even computer security experts could not have
anticipated it, absent further negligence, a corporation should not be
found liable. 20 9 However, courts should closely scrutinize Board action
both prior to and after an attack.
Third, Boards must restructure corporate governance to give
cybersecurity the same emphasis as generating profit.2 10 Companies
should be encouraged to create bylaws or amend current bylaws to outline
204.
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205.
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the scope of a Board's responsibility in relation to cybersecurity. One
expert analogized that "[a] robust and resilient cybersecurity system must
be regarded similarly to the physical locks on the doors of a brick-andmortar building." 21 1 Some technical measures include encrypting
confidential information, and creating firewalls or storing the confidential
data separately from the rest of the financial systems.212 As a matter of
simple good corporate governance, a Board should encourage regular
discussions of and document cybersecurity measures and potential issues
that will inevitably arise. 2 13 Two standards the author suggests are likely
to help a Board survive a breach of fiduciary claim are: creating an
independent committee composed of outside directors to assess
cyberattacks, and outsourcing
the management of data protection to a
214
private cybersecurity firm.
V. TRANSFORMING THE SEC DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE INTO FEDERAL
LAW AND TRANSFORMING SOCIETAL VIEWS ABOUT CYBERSECURITY

Despite the seriousness and gravity of harm that a cyberattack can
exact upon a corporation, the existing SEC rules and regulations do not
require disclosure of attacks. 2 15 Existing law also does not extend liability
to directors as a deterrent or provide positive incentives like exemption
from liability to force corporations to internalize the cost of doing
business. 2 16 Most commentators and scholars anticipated that the adverse
publicity of data breach incidents against large companies would
encourage "proactive corporate disclosure [and remedies] for
cyberattacks. 217 In a 2009 survey, almost 40% of Fortune 500 companies
did not mention cybersecurity in their SEC filings, despite the fact that
218
90% of companies are breached in a given year.
Most corporations fail to mention data breaches for fear of
reputational damage. 219 The disclosure of data breaches to the public may
harm a corporation's future growth capacity, strategic market position,
brand, ability to raise capital, and relationship with its customers and
211. Avellan, supra note 106, at 225.
212. Pessin Katz Law, Cybersecurity Breach: Are Board Members at Risk?,
ABOVETHELAW (Apr. 21 2015, 3:27 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/04/cybersecurity-breach-

are-board-members-at-risk/.
213. Id.
214. Id
215. Sam Young, Contemplating Corporate Disclosure Obligations Arising from
Cybersecurity Breaches, 38 J. CoPP. L. 659, 668 (2013).
216. Id. at 676-78.
217. Id. at667.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id.
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suppliers. 220 Recognizing this growing harm, Senator John D.
Rockefeller and other members of Congress wrote a letter to the SEC
Chairwoman seeking clarification regarding a corporation's duty to
disclose a cyberattack 2 1 In October 2011, the SEC responded with
disclosure guidelines on obligations that corporations should consider
when determining whether to disclose a cybersecurity breach,222
including: risk factors, management's discussion and analysis of financial
condition and results of operations (MD&A), description of business,
legal proceedings, financial statement disclosures, and disclosure
are not official
controls and procedures. 223 Unfortunately, the guidelines
"rule[s], regulation[s], or statement[s]" of the SEC. 224
The author asserts that the primary reason that the SEC has not
transformed the guidelines into rules stems from prevailing ignorant
views of cybersecurity as an externality. An externality is an outside
source that has an external effect on the market. 225 Positive externalities
occur when an activity generates external benefits that an actor cannot
internalize, such as through prices; "[n]egative externalities occur when
one's activity imposes costs on others" that likewise are not transmitted
through prices.2 26 An externality can thus be viewed as a market
failure. 2 27 The government often responds to a negative externality by

discouraging the responsibility through taxation or regulation, whereas
externality is to encourage the conduct, often
the response to a positive
228
subsidies.
through
Cybersecurity is often understood in this context. 229 When a
corporation suffers an intrusion, the harm rarely falls directly on the
corporation. Instead, the costs are borne by third parties. This in turn
represents a negative externality, like pollution. Pollution was ignored as
a problem until everyone felt the effects globally. Similar to the effects
of pollution, a corporation does not shoulder the costs associated with
data breaches and cybersecurity. 230 "What is needed, though, is a cultural
220. Id.
221. Id. at 667-68
222. Id. at 669.
223. ld
224. Id.
225. Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L
REv. L. & ECON. 553, 563 (1999).
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227. Sales, supra note 18, at 1520.
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shift where those in control of large corporations no longer view
cybersecurity as an obligation imposed by the government, and instead
as a necessity." 2 3 ' Therefore, without some outside force requiring
corporations to reduce the incidence of data breaches and
improve
232
cybersecurity measures, a corporation simply will not do so.
VI. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CYBERSECURITY INSURANCE

Cybersecurity liability and privacy insurance are new forms of
professional insurance that can cover issues not traditionally resolved by
legal principles. 233 The policies are designed to cover the costs of
combating first and third party breaches. Coverage includes suits for
damages suffered by the company from other third parties like customers
for the exposure and loss of sensitive data when hackers infiltrate a
company's system and cause significant damage, and the cost of data
recovery and restoration (especially when an attack causes system
disruption and the losses associated with being offline). 234 While
literature abounds regarding cybersecurity insurance, a further discussion
of cyberinsurance as the proper the solution to limiting cyberfiduciary
liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
VII. A HOPEFUL FUTURE FOR CYBERSECURITY-THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (ABA) & CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION AND SHARING
ACT (CISA)
The ABA adopted a resolution in 2013 creating sanctions for
unauthorized and illegal intrusions into computer networks. 235 The
resolution highlighted the increasingly important issue of information
security for attorneys. 236 Breaches expose clients to significant economic
losses that greatly undermine the legal profession by diminishing the
client's confidence in the attorney-client relationship.237
In 2015, it was essential that attorneys stay abreast of cybersecurity
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practices.238 Continuing Legal Education (CLE) programs on
cybersecurity issues have become commonplace. These CLE's provide
239
insight into the most current cybersecurity information and strategies.
who ignore cyberthreats risk millions of dollars for
Like Boards,24lawyers
0
clients.
their
While the courts and Boards may be hesitant to take swift action to
respond to the growing number of computer security breaches, the
Legislature is beginning to take action. In the spring of 2015, the House
passed a cybersecurity measure that would encourage companies to share
their computer records and network access with the federal
government. 24 1 Paul Kurtz, a cybersecurity and information sharing
expert who worked under three presidential administrations stated, "[t]he
gravity of the emergency we have in cyberspace is setting in with
lawmakers;" corporations can no longer combat cyberattacks
individually. 24 2 The House bill would provide corporations legal liability
protection if they participate in the program and share cyberthreat
information with the government.243
To satisfy First Amendment privacy concerns, and persuade wary
corporations, the government provides the liability protection only after
the corporation's personal information data is essentially screened out,
once by the corporation and then by a government agency before any
information is transferred. 244 To stress the gravity of the situation, during
the passage of the House Bill, one politician noted, "[w]e are under attack
as I speak; [t]o do nothing is not an option."245
On October 27, 2015, the Senate finally approved a cybersecurity bill
known as CISA.24 6 CISA has been described as a "voluntary threat
238.
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information-sharing vehicle," by which governmental agencies and
companies in the private sector share and exchange information about
hackers' methods of attack, as well as provide risk alerts. 24 7 In theory,
CISA seems like a great step in the right direction. However, what is
controversial about this bill is that it includes liability protection for
private companies who participate, essentially shielding them from
248
lawsuits for sharing their data.
Naturally, there is a support and opposition concerning the
implications of CISA. Stakeholders and privacy advocates, including the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), fear that the National Security
Agency (NSA) will abuse CISA and engage in warrantless searches to
249
obtain information from citizens unconnected to cybersecurity threats.
Greg Nojeim, a senior counsel at the Center for Democracy and
Technology, believes the bill is a "backdoor wiretap" for the
authorization of sharing sensitive data that have nothing to do with
cybersecurity. 250 On the other side of the debate are stanch proponents of
national security and those who recognize the growing threat of
cyberwarfare. Rajesh De, former general counsel of the NSA astutely
noted, "[i]f you took the position that no single thing solves the problem,
then you would never do anything
251

.

.

[y]ou have to start with

something."
The author agrees more with the proponents of the bill, but shares
some major concerns about its utility and effectiveness. Liability
protection could serve an effect opposite of that intended by the drafters
and proponents of CISA-it could discourage companies from investing
in cybersecurity. It is also possible that CISA could have a negative
cascading effect, reducing competition by making business too expensive
to conduct for small businesses since they would need to invest money
into cybersecurity defense on the same scale as large corporations. Most
cybersecurity experts agree that the bill focuses on a diminishing form of
defense, collecting and sharing cyberattack signatures. 252 However, the
author proposes that CISA's fatal flaw is that it fails to set a threshold
requirement for the implementation of cybersecurity standards. Until
society forces companies to bolster their cyberdefenses and focus on
remedial solutions to hacks rather than emphasizing detection,
cybersecurity will continue to be a free rider problem and operate very
much like pollution-when society decides to act, it will be too late.
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CYBERSECURITY OVERSIGHT: A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR DIRECIORS

CONCLUSION

A Board has an obligation to fulfill its duties of care and loyalty in
good faith and in the best interest of the corporation. It is only a matter of
time before corporate directors are held accountable for cybersecurity
oversight. The author believes that reasonably well-informed directors
recognize cybersecurity risk to corporate value. The author demonstrated
that even if the Courts were to properly reframe oversight as a duty of
care issue, procedural devices such as demand, the SLC, and the BJR
create obstacles to meritorious shareholder derivative cybersecurity
oversight claims alleged as violations of the duty of care.
Stone severely curtailed the viability of cybersecurity oversight
claims. Through faulty transitive logic-the Stone court reasoned that bad
faith falls into the duty of loyalty: Stone determined that most oversight
claims allege bad faith. Therefore, Stone held that oversight claims
necessarily must be brought as a breach of the duty of loyalty.
A Board should be aware and proactive in oversight, not idle until a
corporation suffers a cybercatastrophe. Whether the shareholder claim is
classified as duty of care or duty of loyalty should be irrelevant to a
court's analysis. If a Board utterly fails to create an information system
with respect to cybersecurity or systematically disregards cybersecurity
red flags and as a result the corporation suffers, the directors violated their
fiduciary duties. Rather than becoming consumed with which fiduciary
duty a Board violated, as a matter of policy and fairness, courts should
focus on the merits of claims and hold directors who fail to incorporate
cybersecurity into corporate governance liable for lackluster
cybersecurity measures.
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